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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
ENOCH HANKERSON, : Case No. 20020974-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : APPELLANT IS INCARCERATED 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The State presents three alternative grounds for affirming the trial court's denial 
of Appellant Enoch Hankerson's motion to dismiss for failure to timely prosecute, 
Appellee's Br. 16-20, 25-28, but these grounds should not be considered by this Court. 
This is because none of these grounds is supported by the trial court's findings of fact. 
And, under Utah Supreme Court cases such as State v. Topanotes and Bailey v. Bayles. a 
trial court's ruling may not be affirmed on alternative grounds unless the grounds are 
fully supported by the court's findings of fact. State v. Topanotes. 2003 UT 30, f 9; 
Bailev v.Bavles, 2002 UT 58,1f 19-20, 52 P.3d 1158. 
However, even if the alternative grounds are reached, they do not support an 
affirmance. The State's first alternative ground is that trial could have been scheduled on 
July 31, 2002, but was not scheduled until August 14, 2002 because of the defense 
counsel scheduling conflict. Appellee's Br. 16-17. However, neither the factual findings 
nor the record as a whole reflect this. The factual findings merely note that, at a hearing 
on July 2nd, trial was scheduled for August 14th and a pretrial conference for July 30th.1 
Further, the transcript from July 2 nd shows that the trial court had another trial already 
scheduled for July 31st, and could not offer that trial date. First Case 177 [2-2]. And so, 
there is nothing to show that the defense counsel's scheduling conflicts caused a delay. 
The State's second alternative ground argument is that the defendant's motion to 
transfer two of his three cases to the same court for consolidation caused delay. 
Appellee's Br. at 17-20. However, the transfers did not delay the case. They were 
requested during the first scheduled roll calls of the two cases to be transferred, Second 
Case 27; Third Case 17, and they were necessary to the consolidation of Mr. Hankerson's 
three cases. There is nothing in the 120-day disposition statute or case law to show that 
necessary appearances constitute a delay which must be reviewed for good cause. 
Further, if the prosecutor did consider this a delay, he had an obligation to object to it. 
State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, Tfl4, 34 P.3d 790. But he did not, and so there is no 
basis for this argument. 
The State's last alternative ground, which is that the prosecutor made a good faith 
effort to have the case heard in a timely manner, Appellee's Br. 25-28, does not support 
1
 Third Case 186. Citations to the record in this brief are made the same way as in 
Appellant's Opening Brief. That is, citations to case number 021200613FS will be referred to as 
"First Case" plus the record number. Citations to case number 021200272FS will be referred to 
as "Second Case" plus the record number. Citations to case number 021200271FS will be 
referred to as "Third Case" plus the record number. 
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an affirmance of the trial court. This is because the crux of this appeal is that Mr. 
Hankerson's trial was delayed because the prison records office, pursuant to an illegal 
policy, failed to forward his original 120-day disposition request to the prosecutor and 
court. Aplt Br. 10-28. Whether the prosecutor acted in good faith is beside the point 
because it is the prison records office who was principally at fault. 
In sum, the trial court erred in denying Mr. Hankerson's motion to dismiss this 
case for failure to prosecute within 120 days. Further, the State's alternative grounds do 
not justify an affirmance. So, this case should be reversed and dismissed with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S "ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS" ARGUMENTS 
SHOULD NOT BE REACHED BECAUSE THERE ARE NO 
SUPPORTING FACTUAL FINDINGS 
The crux of the State's argument is that the trial court's denial of Mr. Hankerson's 
motion to dismiss is justified on three bases not considered by the trial court. First, the 
State argues that the delay in prosecuting was caused by the defense counsel's scheduling 
conflict at a July 2nd hearing. Appellee's Br. 16-17. Second, the State's argues that the 
defendant's motion to transfer his cases to the same court caused delay. Id. at 17-20. 
Finally, the State argues that prosecutor made a good faith effort to have the case heard 
in a timely manner. Id. at 25-28. 
However, all of these arguments fail. Indeed, these arguments should not even be 
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considered by this Court because they are not supported by the trial court's findings of 
fact. And, a trial court's decision may not be affirmed on alternative grounds unless it is 
supported by the findings of fact. This is shown by the case law. 
It is undisputed that, in some circumstances, an appellate court may affirm a trial 
court's ruling on alternative grounds. This rule was articulated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. In that case, the Court 
used the rule to affirm the trial court's decision that the plaintiff could not recover on a 
realty contract: 
The law is well settled that a trial court should be affirmed if on the record 
made it can be. The general law is stated in 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 
1464(1) as follows:" * * * The appellate court will affirm the judgment, 
order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs 
from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and 
this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on 
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not 
considered or passed on by the lower court. * * * " 
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969). 
This doctrine comports with due process. Specifically, any alternative grounds 
must be fully supported by uncontroverted evidence. As this Court explained in State v. 
Montoya. a factual basis for alternative grounds may never be assumed: 
Critical to affirmance is the requirement that the ground or theory be 
"apparent on the record."... If, in any way, the ground or theory urged for 
the first time on appeal is not apparent on the record, the principle of 
affirming on any proper ground has no application. To hold otherwise 
would invite the prevailing party to selectively focus on issues below, the 
effect of which is holding back issues that the opposition had neither notice 
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of nor an opportunity to address. Because of this due process component, 
"apparent on the record," in this context, means more than the mere 
assumption or absence of evidence contrary to the "new" ground or theory. 
The record must contain sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting 
the ground or theory to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice 
that the prevailing party may rely thereon on appeal. 
State v. Montova, 937 P.2d 145, 149-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). In fact, 
a strong factual basis has always been essential to the application of the alternative 
grounds rule.2 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court issued two well-articulated opinions, State v. 
Topanotes and Bailey v. Bayles, emphasizing that an alternative ground for affirmance 
must not only be apparent on the record, but also supported by the trial court's factual 
findings. State v. Topanotes. 2003 UT 30, Tf9; Bailevv. Bavles. 2002 UT 58, f20, 52 
P.3d 1158. This is because, as the Utah Supreme Court stated in Bailey v. Bayles. it is 
fundamental that an appellate court may not disregard the trial court's factual findings 
and weigh the evidence to make its own findings of fact. Bailey. 2002 UT 58, TJ19. And 
so, any alternative ground not completely supported by the trial court's findings of fact 
2
 See Dipomav. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, [^18, 29 P.3d 1225 ("because the alternate ground 
for affirmance presented by [appellee/petitioner] is apparent from the record and was briefed and 
argued by the parties on appeal, we choose to address it."); State v. Finlayson. 2000 UT 10, [^31, 
994 P.2d 1243 (where the court has a "complete factual record" it "may affirm a judgment of a 
lower court if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record."); Limb, 461 
P.2d at 293 n.2 ("a trial court should be affirmed if on the record made it can be"); State v. Wells, 
928 P.2d 386, 390-92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (addressing and rejecting an alternative Fourth 
Amendment argument raised by the state for the "first time on appeal"), aff d State v. Wells, 939 
P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997) (unanimously affirming court of appeals' analysis); State v. Chevre. 2000 
UT App 6, fl2, 994 P.2d 1278 (appellate court may affirm where the legal ground raised first on 
appeal was "apparent on the record"). 
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should be rejected: 
In the limited circumstances that an appellate court chooses to affirm on an 
alternate ground, it may do so only where the alternate ground is apparent 
on the record. When an alternate theory is apparent on the record, the court 
of appeals must then determine whether the facts as found by the trial court 
are sufficient to sustain the decision of the trial court on the alternate 
ground. The court of appeals is limited to the findings of fact made by the 
trial court and may not find new facts or reweigh the evidence in light of 
the new legal theory or alternate ground. 
Id. at f20 (emphasis added). As a practical matter, this means that an appellate court must 
first determine whether the alternative ground is apparent on the record, and then look at 
the findings of fact to determine whether the ground is factually supported. Topanotes , 
2003 UT 30,1J9. 
In this case, none of the State's three alternative grounds for affirmance are 
sustainable by the trial court's factual findings. The first alternative ground, which is that 
the defense counsel had a scheduling conflict that delayed the trial, is not supported in 
any degree by either the factual findings or even the record as a whole. The second 
alternative ground, which is that the defendant's motion to transfer his cases to the same 
court caused delay, is addressed in part by the factual findings, but not to a degree that 
allows this Court to reach the issue. The third alternative ground, which is that the 
prosecutor made a good faith effort to have the case heard in a timely manner, is not 
addressed at all in the factual findings. Each of these alternative grounds will be 
examined in order below. 
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A. Neither the Factual Findings Nor the Record Supports that the Defense 
Counsel had a Scheduling Conflict Which Delayed the Trial 
First, the State argues that the trial court properly denied Mr. Hankerson's motion 
to dismiss because trial was set beyond the 120-day deadline due to the defense counsel's 
scheduling conflicts. Appellee's Br. 16-17. The State argues that, at a hearing on July 2 nd, 
the trial court suggested a trial date of September 13th, and the defense counsel responded 
that trial needed to be set sooner. Id. at 16. Then the dates of July 31st or August 14th 
were then suggested, but defense counsel was unavailable for the earlier July 31st date. 
Id at 16-17. Because of this, the State argues, the 120 days should have been tolled from 
the July 31st date. Id at 17. 
However, the trial court's factual findings do not support this. The only findings 
relevant to the July 2nd hearing and subsequent court dates are as follows: 
15 A preliminary hearing was held and the defendant was bound over 
on all remaining charges to the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto for a scheduling 
conference to be held on July 2, 2002. 
16. Roger Blaylock of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
appeared at the scheduling conference on July 2,2002, and the Defendant 
and his Attorney, Kimberly Clark, appeared and a trial date was set for 
August 14, 2002, and a pretrial conference was set for July 30, 2002. The 
jury trial and pretrial conference [were] to be held in the Salt Lake 
Department before the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto due to the fact that the 
Murray Department was to be closed effective July 31, 2002, as to criminal 
matters. 
First Case 152-53; Second Case 49-50; Third Case 186-87. 
None of these findings indicate that a sooner trial date would have been set but for 
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a scheduling conflict of the defense counsel's. Indeed, the findings do not address this 
point at all. They merely state that a pretrial conference was set for July 30th and that trial 
was set for August 14th. First Case 152; Second Case 49; Third Case 186. There is 
nothing that shows that the August 14 th date was set because of defense counsel's 
scheduling conflict. See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ |9 (holding that any alternative ground 
for affirmance must be supported by the trial court's findings of fact); Bailey, 2002 UT 
58, f20 (same). Because of this, the issue should not be reached. 
What is more, even if the record as a whole if reviewed, the State's position is not 
supported. Indeed, the transcript from the July 2 nd hearing itself shows that, contrary to 
the State's argument, the July 31st trial date was not available for trial. First Case 177 [1-
2]. This is because the trial court had another trial scheduled for that date which 
happened to involve Kimberly Clark, Mr. Hankerson's defense counsel at that time. The 
transcript shows the following exchange between the trial court and Ms. Clark: 
MS. CLARK: We would like to set these matters for trial. I want the Court 
to be aware [Mr. Hankerson] has filed a 120 day disposition on this matter 
- on all three matters. My only difficulties are 1 have a trial in front of you 
on the 31st and 1st that's in custody. 
THE COURT: Well, here's the dates that I have because there's a 
conference I must attend on September 11th and 12th which is trial - which 
is a date. I have July 31st, August the 14th. 
MS. CLARK: And on the 31s t I already have an in custody case with you. 
THE COURT: [inaudible]. 
MS. CLARK: That's an aggravated robbery with Mr. Petty. And that's 
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going to trial. So the Court [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: The 14 th of August then? 
MS. CLARK: Great. 
Id 
This shows that the trial court had another trial scheduled on the 31st and could not 
offer that date. Besides that, the transcript actually supports that the defense counsel was 
doing everything she could to avoid going beyond the 120-day deadline. The defense 
counsel, who had no duty to make the court aware of the 120-day disposition or make 
efforts to move the case forward,3 did both of those things. Id. She made every effort to 
have the case tried in time, and agreed to the first date the court had available, which was 
August 14th and not July 31st, as the court originally thought. Id. And so, there is no basis 
in the transcript for the State's argument that an earlier trial date was missed because of 
defense counsel's schedule. 
Likewise, there is no merit to the State's complaint that the defense counsel had an 
in-custody homicide trial the first week in August, but "made no offer of availability for 
[trial for] an earlier date" than that. Appellee's Br. at 17. The trial court's first available 
trial date before September was August 14 th. Id at 2. The court had no date available 
before the first week in August, or even the first week in August, so the defense 
counsel's schedule before August 14 th was inconsequential. Ld What is more, the defense 
3
 It is the prosecutor who bears the burden of moving the case forward under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999). State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998). 
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counsel stated at the beginning of the hearing that she would make room for trial at any 
time with the only exceptions of the July 31st matter that she already had scheduled with 
that court, and a homicide trial the following week. Id. at 1. All of this shows that the 
defense counsel did not cause a scheduling problem. 
In sum, the State's argument that the trial court should be affirmed on the 
alternative ground that the defense counsel caused a scheduling conflict should not be 
reached. This argument is not supported in the findings of fact or even in the transcript 
cited by the State, and so there is no basis for review. 
B. The Factual Findings do not Support that the Case Transfers Caused a 
Delay Attributable to Mr, Hankerson 
The State's second alternative ground for an affirmance is that Mr. Hankerson 
caused a delay by requesting a transfer of two of his three cases so that the three cases 
could be consolidated. Appellee's Br. 17-20. The State argues that, on April 3 rd, the 
defense counsel requested a continuance to transfer his two Salt Lake cases to the Murray 
court, where the third was pending, so that "counsel could more conveniently represent 
defendant in all of them." Appellee's Br. 18. This continuance lasted until May 1st, the 
State argues. Id at 19. So, according to the State, the eighteen days between April 9th, 
when the prison received Mr. Hankerson's first 120-day disposition request, and May 1st 
should be tolled. IcL 
But the trial court's factual findings do not support that this was a delay 
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attributable to Mr. Hankerson. Indeed, the findings list only relevant dates and basic 
information about the transfer requests. Specifically, the findings show the following: 
* The First Case was filed in the Murray Department of the 3 rd Judicial District 
Court on March 7, 2002. Third Case 183. 
* The Second Case was originally filed in the Salt Lake Department of the 3 r d 
Judicial District Court on March 21,2002. IcL 
* The Third Case was originally filed in the Salt Lake Department of the 3 r d 
Judicial District Court on March 15, 2002. IdL 
* Kimberly Clark of the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Office was appointed to 
represent Mr. Hankerson in all three cases. IdL at 183-84. 
* Mr. Hankerson made his initial appearance in the First Case, and roll call was 
held April 3, 2002. IcL at 183. At that time, the First Case "was continued by the 
Defendant and his Attorney, Kimberly Clark, until May 1, 2002, to allow the Salt Lake 
Department criminal cases to be transferred to the Murray Department of the Third 
District Court.1' Id at 184. 
* Mr. Hankerson made initial appearances in the Second and Third Cases in 
March, 2002, and roll call for both cases was set for April 9, 2002. Id . at 183-84. 
* At the April 9th roll call, the Second and Third Cases were transferred to the 
Murray Department. IdL at 184. Another roll call was set for these two cases for May 1st, 
along with the First Case. IcL at 184. 
11 
* The prosecutor did not request the continuance of the First Case, or the transfer 
of the Second and Third Cases. Id. 
To be sure, these findings give some information about the transfer dates and 
continuance and transfer requests. However, much of the information needed to 
determine whether these transfers constituted good cause for a continuance is missing. 
For example, the findings do not show whether the prosecutor objected to the motions 
for a continuance and for transfers. They do not show whether the prosecutor mentioned 
the possible filing of a request for 120-day disposition. They do not show the reason for 
the transfers. And, they do not show how the May 1st roll call date was scheduled and 
whether any party or the court had scheduling conflicts with a sooner date. 
Without this information, a conclusion about whether the transfers constituted a 
good-cause delay cannot be reached by this Court. Cases such as State v. Heaton. State v. 
Petersen, and State v. Coleman suggest that the prosecutor should object to any delays 
and bring the possibility of a 120-day disposition request to the trial court's attention. 
Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915; State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, Tfl4, 34 P.3d 790. Further, the trial court as well as the 
prosecutor has an obligation to move a case forward; so in this case, if the court was not 
available for roll call any sooner, there is no good-cause delay. See. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 
915 (court's administrative matters do not justify trial delay). The bottom line is that the 
lack of factual findings about the reason for the transfers or scheduling information 
12 
makes the matter unresolvable on the record. So, this issue should not be reached. 
However, the State argues that the issue should be reached and cites to the roll call 
transcript of the First Case, where the defense counsel made a few comments about the 
transfer requests. Appellee's Br. 18-19. But this transcript merely shows that the defense 
counsel asked for a continuance in the First Case to allow time for the Second and Third 
Cases to be transferred so that they could be handled together.4 And her reasons for 
doing this aren't clear. She mentions that it would be convenient to have the cases 
together, but also gives another reason which was inaudible on the transcript. First Case 
176 [1]. Significantly, the transcript shows that the prosecutor did not object to the 
request for a continuance, or mention the possibility of a 120-day disposition request. Id. 
at 1-2. If anything, this supports that there was no good-cause delay. 
Also, nothing in the records of the Second and Third Cases is helpful to the 
State's argument. The transcripts of both cases merely show that the cases were 
transferred from Salt Lake to Murray on April 10, 2002. Second Case 25; Third Case 15. 
Then, roll call for both was held May 1st. Second Case 29; Third Case 19. There is no 
other information. And at any rate, reference to a transcript is not enough to support a 
4
 First Case 176 [1]. The continuance was requested at the roll call of the First Case, 
which was in Murray on April 3, 2002. Id. at 27. The roll calls of the Second and Third Cases, 
which were in Salt Lake, were held April 9,2002, and the transfer requests were made then. 
Second Case 27; Third Case 17. The cases were transferred the next day. Second Case 25; Third 
Case 15. Roll call on all the three cases was held in Murray on May 1st. First Case 32. 
13 
conclusion by this Court about whether there was a good-cause delay.5 
All in all, the issue about whether the case transfers caused a delay cannot be 
reached because the factual findings do not provide enough information to make the 
determination. Further, it is inappropriate to refer to the transcripts or other parts of the 
record because they do not give all of the information necessary to make factual findings. 
So, this Court should not consider the State's argument that there was a good-cause delay 
caused by the transfer requests in this case. 
C. The Factual Findings do not Address Whether the Prosecutor Acted in 
Good Faith 
The State argues, as a third alternative ground for affirmance, that the prosecutor 
made a good faith effort to have the case tried within the 120-day time period. Appellee's 
Br. 25-28. The prosecutor initially knew only of the third disposition request, the State 
argues, and he tried to have the case heard within that time frame. Appellee's Br. 26. So, 
a dismissal of this case would be unfair. Id. 
But the trial court's factual findings do not address this at all, other than to note 
that, originally, only the third request was forwarded to the Salt Lake County District 
5
 See Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ [9 ("not only must the alternative ground be apparent on 
the record, it must also be sustainable by the factual findings of the trial court."); Bailey 2002 
UT 58,1f20 ("When an alternate theory is apparent on the record, the court of appeals must then 
determine whether the facts as found by the trial court are sufficient to sustain the decision of the 
trial court on the alternate ground.") 
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Attorney's Office.6 Besides, this argument does not fully take into account the 120-day 
disposition statute. Whether a prosecutor makes a good faith effort to try a case within 
120 days is, of course, important in determining whether a case should be dismissed 
under the 120-day disposition statute. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915-16. But it is not the only 
relevant factor. A case may be dismissed for many other reasons. For example, it may be 
dismissed because of court administrative errors,7 or because the prosecutor did learn of 
the 120-day disposition notice in time to avoid delay. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^ [14. 
Indeed, the burden to try the case within 120 days is not, in practicality, the 
prosecutor's alone. It is the State's responsibility. The defendant's holding facility, 
sheriff or other law enforcement, and court share in the duty to bring a defendant to trial.5 
6
 Third Case 185. The findings also show that the 120-day disposition request was 
properly made and the prosecutor had actual notice of the request: 
The Defendant's request for disposition was sufficiently completed to put the 
State of Utah on notice of pending charges and the Salt Lake District Attorney's 
Office properly identified all pending cases against the defendant when it received 
the disposition request of May 17,2002, and the Salt Lake District Attorney's 
Office did in fact identify all pending charges in its jurisdiction after receiving the 
Notice and Request for Disposition received May 17, 2002. 
Id 
7Heaton,958P.2dat915. 
8
 See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (2) & (3) (1999) ("(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer, upon receipt of the demand described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the 
demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the 
appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall, 
upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such information 
concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. (3) After 
written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the 
15 
The failure of any of these to do their part may result in a dismissal of a case. 
However, the State asserts that a dismissal of this case is unfair and that 
dismissing it would reward Mr. Hankerson for being deceptive and for manipulating the 
system. The State says: 
The State should not have to suffer the ultimate in sanctions - dismissal 
with prejudice of all charges - where the prosecutor complied with his duty 
under the statute to the best of his ability, and the only person who could 
have corrected the prosecutor's misperception of the disposition period -
defendant - did not timely do so. Such a ruling would permit defendants to 
manipulate the system to their own advantage and obtain a windfall benefit 
from their deception. 
Appellee's Br. 28. 
But there is no substance to this. As already shown, even if a prosecutor does what 
he can to comply with the statute, administrative errors or other events may cause the 
dismissal of the case.9 And, whether this is fair is a matter for the legislature to decide. 
By enacting the 120-day disposition statute, the legislature determined that a case should 
be dismissed with prejudice if it is not heard within 120 days of a defendant's properly-
executed and delivered request. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). This is the plain 
defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel 
being present, may be granted any reasonable continuance.") 
9
 Mr. Hankerson does not concede that the prosecutor did everything he could in this case 
to comply with the statute. See Aplt. Br. 25-27 (arguing that the prosecutor could have done 
more to make the August 6th deadline in this case). However, even if it is assumed that he did, 
this is not enough to justify the State's failure to bring Mr. Hankerson to trial within 120 days of 
his original request for 120-day disposition. 
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language of the 120-day disposition statute, and the plain language must be given 
force.11 And so, the State's argument that dismissing this case would be unfair is not 
legally supported. 
Finally, the State's implication that Mr. Hankerson was being deceptive in this 
case is unfounded. There is no indication that Mr. Hankerson, who is not legally trained, 
attempted to cause confusion by sending three notices for 120-day disposition. Indeed, he 
was simply following the prison records office's instructions to "resubmit [his 120-day 
disposition notice] when you have the funds [to mail it] or have met the indigent policy." 
First Case D. Ex. 2; Third Case 43-44. 
Further, there is no indication that Mr. Hankerson's original attorney, Kimberly 
Clark of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, knew of the three notices and 
deliberately withheld this information. After all, she handled only the roll call and 
preliminary hearing before the case was reassigned. First Case 32, 44-45. Further, Mr. 
Hankerson's substitute counsel, Robert Heineman, brought the original notice to the 
attention of the court and prosecutor at his first court appearance after he was assigned to 
10
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999) ("If the court finds that the failure of the 
prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported by good 
cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the 
matter dismissed with prejudice.") 
11
 Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist.. 2002 UT 130,1f2l, 63 P.3d 705; State v. Bluff. 2002 
UT 66, U34, 52 P.3d 1210; State v. Laffertv. 2001 UT 19, fW, 20 P.3d 342. 
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this case.12 
In sum, there is no indication of deceptiveness or manipulation here. The crux of 
this case is that the prison records office maintained an illegal policy for handling 
prisoners' 120-day disposition requests,13 and this case should have been dismissed as a 
result. 
II. EVEN IF THE "ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS" ARGUMENTS ARE 
REACHED. THEY FAIL ON THE MERITS 
Procedurally, even when a trial court's factual findings give enough information 
for an alternative grounds review, the trial court's reasoning should be reviewed first. 
Then, if this reasoning fails, the alternative grounds arguments may be reviewed.14 But in 
this case, neither the trial court's reasoning nor the alternative grounds arguments have 
merit. And so, this case should be reversed as a matter of law. 
The following subsection shows why the State's argument that the trial court's 
12
 First Case 54-55; 177 [3-1]. Mr. Heineman appeared in this case on July 11, 2002. Id. 
at 51. The next scheduled court appearance was a pretrial conference on July 30th, and Mr. 
Heineman brought the original notice to the court's and prosecutor's attention at that time. Id. at 
177 [3-1]. 
13
 See Aplt. Br. 10-16,18-25 (demonstrating that the prison records office violated the 
120-day disposition statute by not forwarding properly-executed and delivered 120-day 
disposition requests to the prosecutor an court). 
14
 See Dipoma, 2001 UT 61,1fl7 (addressing the alternative grounds arguments after 
rejecting the appellant's principle argument); In re J.D.M., 808 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) ("Because we can affirm the juvenile court's finding that grounds exist for terminating 
appellant's parental rights based on abandonment, it is unnecessary to address the alternative 
ground of parental unfitness.1') 
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reasoning is sound is incorrect. The subsequent subsection demonstrates that the State's 
alternative grounds arguments, if reached, do not support an affirmance. 
A. The State Makes no Substantial Argument in Support of the Trial 
Court's Grounds for its Denial of the Motion to Dismiss 
With regard to the trial court's rulings, the State agrees with Mr. Hankerson that 
the court correctly found that the commencement date for the 120-day period was April 
9, 2002, when the original 120-day disposition request was received by the prison 
records office. Appellee's Br. 20-21. However, unlike Mr. Hankerson, the State supports 
the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. But the State advances only one 
substantial argument in favor of the trial court's reasoning.15 That is, that the court was 
correct in denying the motion based on its conclusion that the 120-day period tolled from 
July 30, 2002 to August 9, 2002. Id. at 21. The State argues that this was correct because 
July 30th was the date that Mr. Hankerson raised the issue of the 120-day disposition, and 
August 9th was the day that the motion was heard. I&_ at 22-23. 
But the State itself acknowledges that the motion did not actually delay the trial. 
15
 Besides the substantial argument, the State does mention the trial court's ruling that Mr. 
Hankerson caused confusion by sending the prison records office three different requests for 120-
day disposition. But the State does not seriously support this ruling. Appellee's Br. 24-25. 
Instead, the State merely summarizes Mr. Hankerson's argument that the confusion was actually 
created by the prison records office's failure to send the first two notices. Id. at 25. Then the State 
describes this arguments as "interesting" and says that "this Court need not reach defendant's 
argument." Id. 
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Id. at 23. The trial date was already set before the motion was made and was not 
rescheduled for the motion.16 As Mr. Hankerson argued in the opening brief, the motion 
did not disarrange the trial date in any way, and so there is no basis for tolling the period 
between the time the defense counsel stated his intent to file the motion and the date of 
the motion hearing. Aplt. Br. 17-18. 
The State argues, nevertheless, that the motion caused confusion about the 120-
day period and so tolling is appropriate. Id. at 23-24. However, there is no legal or 
practical basis for this argument. As just stated, there is no practical basis because the 
trial was not delayed because of the motion. Additionally, there is no legal basis in the 
120-day disposition statute or case law. Of course, there is case law holding that a delay 
caused by a defendant's motion may toll the 120 days,17 but these cases do not support 
that Mr. Hankerson's Motion to Dismiss tolled the period here. This is because, in those 
cases, the motions actually did cause trial delays. 
For instance, in State v. Heaton. cited by the State in support of its position, trial 
had to be rescheduled because the defendant requested a preliminary hearing, which he 
had initially waived. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. The requested preliminary hearing caused 
a delay from September 9th, when trial was originally scheduled, to September 27 th, when 
16
 The trial date was scheduled on July 2, 2002 for August 14th. First Case 49-50; Second 
Case 37-38; Third Case 29-30. This date was never changed. 
17
 In support of its position, the State cites to State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911, 916 Utah 
1998); State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Utah 1986); and State v. Peterson. 2002 UT 
App. 53,1f8, 42 P.3d 1258. 
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the defendant was arraigned after being bound over. Id_ This delay tolled the 120 days, 
the Utah Supreme Court ruled. Id. 
In State v. Banner, also cited by the State, the defendant caused three different 
postponements of trial. Trial was originally scheduled for July 12 th, but was postponed to 
September 5th because of the defendant's need to change counsel. Banner, 717 P.2d at 
1329. Then, the September 5th trial was postponed to November 13th on the defendant's 
motion. Id Finally, the November 13 th trial was postponed to December 4 th in order for 
the court to hear the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial and motion to 
exclude evidence of his prior convictions. Id. These were actual delays that were caused 
solely by the defendant, the Utah Supreme Court ruled, and so they could not be counted 
in calculating whether the defendant's speedy trial right was violated. Id. at 1329-30. 
In State v. Coleman, which was not cited by the State but is on point, the 
defendant filed a motion to suppress and a motion to dismiss, and these motions were 
heard approximately six weeks later. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^ 10-11, 34 
P.3d 790. During this period, trial could not be scheduled. Id. This Court found that this 
tolled the 120 days from the time that the first motion was filed until the motions were 
heard and a ruling issued. Id. at ^ [11. 
In State v. Petersen, cited by the State, the defendant's motion to suppress caused 
the court to delay the trial schedule so that a motion schedule could be set. Petersen, 2002 
UT App 53,1J7-8. This motion schedule was established to accommodate the defense 
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counsel's schedule and need for time. Id. at ^ [7. In fact, a trial schedule could not even be 
set until the motion was resolved. Id. In these circumstances, this Court ruled that the 
motion caused a tolling of the 120 days. Id. at 1J8. 
Finally, other cases not cited by the State also show that the 120 days may be 
tolled only if there is an actual time delay. In State v. Pathammavong. this Court ruled 
that the 120 days was tolled as a result of delays caused by the defendant's three requests 
for continuances, "two for new counsel to prepare for hearings and the third to interview 
a newly discovered witness." State v. Pathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). In State v. Maestas, the 120 days was tolled because the "[djefendant filed 
several continuances, changed counsel twice, and agreed to postpone trial until after the 
disposition of his pretrial motions." State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319,1321 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
All of this shows that the 120 days is tolled only if an actual delay occurs. 
Contrary to the State's argument, the 120 days cannot be tolled simply because parties 
were uncertain how Mr. Hankerson's motion, which did not delay trial, would be ruled 
upon. While it is true that the disposition of the motion may have affected whether the 
trial was necessary, it did not actually delay trial. And so, there is no basis to toll the 120 
days because of this motion. 
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B. The " Alternative Grounds" Arguments are Contradicted by the 120-day 
Disposition Statute and the Case Law 
The State's three alternative grounds arguments are not soundly based in the law. 
The State's first ground is that a July 31st trial date could have been set but for the 
defense counsel's scheduling conflict. Appellee's Br. 16-17. However, as already shown, 
July 31st was not actually available because the trial court already had a trial scheduled on 
that date. First Case 177 [2-1 through 2]. Further, the transcript of the scheduling hearing 
shows that the defense counsel did everything possible to schedule a timely trial. She 
informed the court of the 120-day notice, Id. at 2-1, objected to a September trial date as 
being too late, Id, agreed to the August 14th date that the court had available, Id, at 2-2, 
and answered the court's legal questions about the 120-day disposition statute. Id_ at 2-3. 
In general, she insisted that trial be scheduled as soon as possible. Id. at 2-1 through 4. 
The prosecutor did none of this even though it is the prosecutor who has the legal burden 
of moving the case forward. See. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915 (the duty of complying with the 
120-day statute is on the prosecutor). And so, there is no factual legal basis for the State's 
alternative grounds argument that the defense counsel caused a delay in this case. 
The State's second alternative ground is equally meritless. This is that the 
defendant's motion to transfer his cases to the same court caused delay. Appellee's Br. at 
17-20. However, as this Court already decided in State v. Coleman. the prosecutor may 
not passively stand by and accept delays. Coleman. 2001 UT App. 281, ^14. This is 
particularly true at the beginning of the case, when the prosecutor knows that a 120-day 
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disposition request may be forthcoming. Id. 
Further, in this case, the transfer requests came almost immediately. In fact, they 
came soon after the first appearances in the three cases,18 and just a few days before the 
prison records office received Mr. Hankerson's first request for 120-day disposition on 
April 9, 2002. First Case D. Ex. 2. This was soon enough in the proceedings that the 
prosecutor should have been cognizant of the possibility of the 120-day disposition, and 
avoided delays. 
What is more, the transfers do not even constitute a delay. The transfers were 
necessary for the consolidation of the cases, which appears to have been contemplated, 
and there is nothing to show that necessary proceedings constitute delays under the 120-
day disposition statute.19 In fact, such proceedings are precisely what should be taken 
into account as the parties schedule the pretrial and trial appearances, and work to keep 
these appearances within 120 days. And so, the State's second alternative ground for 
affirmance fails. 
Finally, the last alternative ground, which is that prosecutor made a good faith 
effort to have the case heard in a timely manner, does not justify an affirmance. This is 
18
 Defense Counsel put in an appearance in the First Case on March 19, 2002, First Case 
19, the Second Case on April 1st, Second Case 21, and the Third Case on April 1st, Third Case 11. 
The case transfers were requested on April 3rd. First Case 27-28. 
19
 See Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, ^14 (necessary appearances such as preliminary 
hearing must fit into 120 days); Heatoa 958 P.2d at 915 (implying that prosecutor's duty to try 
within 120 days includes the necessary appearances). 
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because, as already shown in the First Section above, the prosecutor's good faith alone 
does not prevent a dismissal under the 120-day disposition statute. The State's duty to 
prosecute includes not only the prosecutor, but the holding facility records officers and 
agents, sheriff or other law enforcement, and court system. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 
(1)(2) & (4) (1999). In this case, the prison records office applied an illegal policy of not 
forwarding properly-executed and delivered notices for 120-day disposition. And so, this 
case should have been dismissed. 
In sum, neither the trial court's reasoning nor the State's alternative grounds 
justifies an affirmance. The State failed to bring Mr. Hankerson to trial within 120 days 
after his original request for 120-day disposition, and no good cause supported the delay. 
And so, this case should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Hankerson respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and dismiss the charges with prejudice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 'gi* day of September, 2003. 
C / LEATHER JOHNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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